Philosophical Studies 178 (1):209-234 (2021)

David Liebesman
University of Calgary
There is a defeasible constraint against double counting. When I count colours, for instance, I can’t freely count both a colour and its shades. Once we properly grasp this constraint, we can solve the problem of the many. Unlike other solutions, this solution requires us to reject neither our counting judgments, nor the metaphysical principles that seemingly conflict with them. The key is recognizing that the judgments and principles are compatible due to the targeted effects of the defeasible constraint.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01428-9
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,512
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary.Daniel Z. Korman - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thinking About Many.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2863-2882.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Fine-Tuning as Old Evidence, Double Counting, and the Multiverse.Simon Friederich - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):363-377.
Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration.Charlotte Werndl & Katie Steele - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Counting as a Type of Measuring.David Liebesman - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.
Counting by Identity: A Reply to Liebesman.Oliver R. Marshall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):385-390.
We Do Not Count by Identity.David Liebesman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):21-42.
A Topological Constraint Language with Component Counting.Ian Pratt-Hartmann - 2002 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 12 (3-4):441-467.
Counting and Arithmetic Principles First.Rochel Gelman - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):653-654.
Model Tuning in Engineering: Uncovering the Logic.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2015 - Journal of Strain Analysis for Engineering Design 51 (1):63-71.
How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications: Discussions.Deborah G. Mayo - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):857-879.


Added to PP index

Total views
84 ( #140,222 of 2,520,901 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #72,169 of 2,520,901 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes