Realizability models refuting Ishiharaʼs boundedness principle

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (12):1803-1807 (2012)
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Abstract

Ishiharaʼs boundedness principleBD-N was introduced in Ishihara [5] and has turned out to be most useful for constructive analysis, see e.g. Ishihara [6]. It is equivalent to the statement that every sequentially continuous function from NN to N is continuous w.r.t. the usual metric topology on NN. We construct models for higher order arithmetic and intuitionistic set theory in which both every function from NN to N is sequentially continuous and in which the axiom of choice from NN to N holds. Since the latter is known to be inconsistent with the statement that all functions from NN to N are continuous these models refute BD-N

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