The Filmic Representation of ‘Relived’ Experiences

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59 (2):56-65 (2022)
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Abstract

This comment discusses Emar Maier’s argument against the characterization of unreliable filmic narration as personal narration. My comment focuses on two assumptions of Maier’s argument, viz. that the narrating character’s mental states can be described independently of other mental states/experiences and that personal filmic narration can only proceed from a de se perspective. I contend that the majority of movies with unreliable narration represents an experientially parasitic mental state. Since these states are well-known to involve perspective-shifting and various kinds of semantic enrichment, unreliable filmic representation is perfectly compatible with the presence of a personal narrator.

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Kristina Liefke
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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Pictorial free perception.Dorit Abusch & Mats Rooth - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (4):747-798.

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