Constructive methodological deflationism, dialetheism and the Liar

Analysis 74 (4):566-574 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that it does not, and I show that it in fact provides a classical response to the Liar paradox

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,953

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Can deflationists be dialetheists?Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
Deflating logical consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Why the liar does not matter.Lon Berk - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):323-341.
A Dilemma for Dialetheism.Jason Zarri - 2010 - The Dualist 15 (Spring):21-31.
Truth and Disquotation.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317 - 352.
Truth and disquotation.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317--352.
Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar.Greg Littmann - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.
Truth in Constructive Empiricism.Jamin Asay - 2007 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Against classical dialetheism.Wenfang Wang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):492-500.
Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth.Jamin Asay - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.
Questioning Constructive Reverse Mathematics.I. Loeb - 2012 - Constructivist Foundations 7 (2):131-140.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-09-05

Downloads
125 (#148,494)

6 months
25 (#118,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Liggins
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
The Nonexistent.Anthony J. Everett - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.

View all 19 references / Add more references