Analysis 74 (4):566-574 (2014)

Authors
David Liggins
University of Manchester
Abstract
Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that it does not, and I show that it in fact provides a classical response to the Liar paradox
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anu087
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References found in this work BETA

The Nonexistent.Anthony Everett - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Hermeneutic Fictionalism.Jason Stanley - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.

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