Nihilism without Self-Contradiction


Authors
David Liggins
University of Manchester
Abstract
in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.) Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peter van Inwagen claims that there are no tables or chairs. He also claims that sentences such as ‘There are chairs here’, which seem to imply their existence, are often true. This combination of views opens van Inwagen to a charge of self-contradiction. I explain the charge, and van Inwagen’s response to it, which involves the claim that sentences like ‘There are tables’ shift their truth-conditions between different contexts of utterance. I present an alternative response which involves the negation of that claim, and argue that it is preferable to van Inwagen’s.
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246108000635
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Question of Realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.
Material Beings.Peter VAN INWAGEN - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ideological Parsimony.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles About Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):842-868.
Composition.Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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