The autism objection to pretence theories

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):764-782 (2010)
A pretence theory of a discourse is one which claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we utter when taking part in the discourse: instead, we are speaking from within a pretence. Jason Stanley argues that if a pretence account of a discourse is correct, people with autism should be incapable of successful participation in it; but since people with autism are capable of participiating successfully in the discourses which pretence theorists aim to account for, all these accounts should be rejected. I discuss how pretence theorists can respond, and apply this discussion to two pretence theories, Stephen Yablo's account of arithmetic and Kendall Walton's account of negative existentials. I show how Yablo and Walton can escape Stanley's objection
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.656.x
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Abstract Expressionism and the Communication Problem.David Liggins - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):599-620.
Pretense, Mathematics, and Cognitive Neuroscience.Jonathan Tallant - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs013.
The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism.Stuart Brock - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):574-592.

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