Weaseling and the Content of Science

Mind 121 (484):997-1005 (2012)
Authors
David Liggins
University of Manchester
Abstract
I defend Joseph Melia’s nominalist account of mathematics from an objection raised by Mark Colyvan
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzs112
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

There is No Easy Road to Nominalism.M. Colyvan - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):285-306.
Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
Response to Colyvan.Joseph Melia - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):75-80.
On What There's Not.Joseph Melia - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):223 - 229.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Abstract Expressionism and the Communication Problem.David Liggins - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):599-620.
Reading the Book of the World.Thomas Donaldson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1051-1077.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Anti-Platonist Strategies.Chris Daly & Simon Langford - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1107-1116.
Taking the Easy Road Out of Dodge.J. Azzouni - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):951-965.
Taking It Easy: A Response to Colyvan.Mary Leng - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):983-995.
An Easy Road to Nominalism.O. Bueno - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):967-982.
Why the Weasel Fails.Y. Raley - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):339-345.
General-Purpose Content.Carolyn S. Price - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):123-133.
The Presence of Mind.Daniel D. Hutto - 1999 - Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science.David M. Braun - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):375-89.
A New Theory of Content I: Basic Content. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):595 - 620.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-08-25

Total downloads
577 ( #4,331 of 2,285,630 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
99 ( #3,029 of 2,285,630 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature