Are reasons evidence of oughts?
Logos and Episteme 3 (1):153-160 (2012)
Abstract
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
DOI
10.5840/logos-episteme20123158
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References found in this work
Reasons, Facts‐About‐Evidence, and Indirect Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):237-243.
A challenge to positive relevance theorists: Reply to Roush.Peter Achinstein - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):521-524.
