Are reasons evidence of oughts?

Logos and Episteme 3 (1):153-160 (2012)
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Abstract

In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.

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Franck Lihoreau
New University of Lisbon

Citations of this work

Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.

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References found in this work

Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Reasons and evidence one ought.John Brunero - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):538-545.

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