Moral error theory

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109 (2004)
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Abstract

The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue that the latter model shows greater promise for an error theorist whose commitment to moral thought is initially serious

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Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

Citations of this work

If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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