Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism

In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer.

Similar books and articles

Moral Skepticism.M. Rakibuz Zaman - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 12:351-356.
Moral Skepticism: New Essays.Diego E. Machuca (ed.) - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.
Neurofeedback-Based Moral Enhancement and the Notion of Morality.Koji Tachibana - 2017 - The Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series 66 (2):25-41.
Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism.Drew Johnson - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):116-133.
Index.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009-04-10 - In Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 375–387.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-17

Downloads
97 (#182,928)

6 months
632 (#2,110)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references