In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 7. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 161-183 (2017)

Eden Lin
Ohio State University
Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper introduces a new view, Asymmetrism, on which you sometimes benefit at the time of desire and sometimes benefit at the time of object. On this view, if the time at which you have a desire is later than the time at which its object obtains, then you benefit at the time of the desire. On the other hand, if the time of object is later than the time of desire, then you benefit at the time of object. Three arguments are given for the conclusion that Asymmetrism is superior to the Time of Desire and Time of Object views. It is argued that Asymmetrism and Concurrentism are the most credible answers to the timing question.
Keywords Well-being  Welfare  Desire Satisfactionism  Desire Satisfaction  Concurrentism  Time of Desire  Time of Object  Asymmetrism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,379
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Experience Requirement on Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):867-886.
A New Well‐Being Atomism.Gil Hersch & Daniel Weltman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Well‐Being, Part 2: Theories of Well‐Being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.
Posthumous Repugnancy.Benjamin Kultgen - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Desire Satisfactionism and Time.Alexander Sarch - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):221-245.
Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
Desire Satisfaction, Death, and Time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.
The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.
The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism.Dan Lowe & Joseph Stenberg - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):247-263.
Ex Ante Desire and Post Hoc Satisfaction.Harriett Baber - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press. pp. 249--267.
Preferentism and the Paradox of Desire.Bradford Skow - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2009 (3):1-17.
Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being.Donald W. Bruckner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29.
Desire and Selfhood.James Mensch - 2015 - The European Legacy 20 (7):689-698.
Conflicts of Desire.Steven Arkonovich - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):51-63.
Philosophy and Desire.Hugh J. Silverman (ed.) - 2000 - Routledge.


Added to PP index

Total views
46 ( #248,196 of 2,519,696 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #166,865 of 2,519,696 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes