Authors
Eden Lin
Ohio State University
Abstract
On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects’ favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views.
Keywords Pleasure  Attitudinal theories of pleasure  Phenomenological theories of pleasure  Hedonism  Well-being  Welfare  Fred Feldman  Chris Heathwood
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12558
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References found in this work BETA

Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.Bruce Brower & L. W. Sumner - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):309.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Experience Requirement on Well-Being.Eden Lin - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
Plaisir (Entrée académique).Antonin Broi - 2020 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.

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