Minds and Machines 15 (2):131-181 (2005)
The well-known game of chess has traditionally been modeled in artificial intelligence studies by search engines with advanced pruning techniques. The models were thus centered on an inference engine manipulating passive symbols in the form of tokens. It is beyond doubt, however, that human players do not carry out such processes. Instead, chess masters instead carry out perceptual processes, carefully categorizing the chunks perceived in a position and gradually building complex dynamic structures to represent the subtle pressures embedded in the positions. In this paper we will consider two hypotheses concerning the underlying subcognitive processes and architecture. In the first hypothesis, a multiple-leveled chess representational structure is presented, which includes distance graphs (with varying levels of quality) between pieces, piece mobilities, and abstract roles. These representational schemes seem to account for numerous characteristics of human player’s psychology. The second hypothesis concerns the extension of the architecture proposed in the Copycat project as central for modeling the emergent intuitive perception of a chess position. We provide a synthesis on how the postulated architecture models chess intuition as an emergent mixture of simultaneous distance estimations, chunk perceptions, abstract role awareness, and intention activations. This is an alternative model to the traditional AI approaches, focusing on the philosophy of active symbols.
|Keywords||active symbols artificial intelligence chess cognitive modeling psychology of intuition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Chunking Mechanisms in Human Learning.F. Gobet, P. Lane, S. Croker, P. Cheng, G. Jones, I. OlIver & J. Pine - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):236-243.
Five Seconds or Sixty? Presentation Time in Expert Memory.Fernand Gobet & Herbert A. Simon - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (4):651-682.
Citations of this work BETA
Expertise and Intuition: A Tale of Three Theories. [REVIEW]Fernand Gobet & Philippe Chassy - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):151-180.
Specialization Effect and Its Influence on Memory and Problem Solving in Expert Chess Players.Merim Bilalić, Peter McLeod & Fernand Gobet - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1117-1143.
Sparse Distributed Memory: Understanding the Speed and Robustness of Expert Memory.Marcelo S. Brogliato, Daniel M. Chada & Alexandre Linhares - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
They Do What They Are Told to Do: The Influence of Instruction on (Chess) Expert Perception—Commentary on Linhares and Brum (2007).Merim Bilalić & Fernand Gobet - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (5):743-747.
Dynamic Sets of Potentially Interchangeable Connotations: A Theory of Mental Objects.Alexandre Linhares - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):389-390.
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