Against Welfare Subjectivism

Noûs 51 (2):354-377 (2017)

Authors
Eden Lin
Ohio State University
Abstract
Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it.
Keywords Welfare  Well-being  Subjectivism  Desire satisfactionism  Informed desire theories
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/nous.12131
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References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meaning in the Lives of Humans and Other Animals.Duncan Purves & Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):317-338.
Why Should Welfare ‘Fit’?Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):685-24.
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize.Eden Lin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):2-23.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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