Synthese 91 (3):195-237 (1992)

Sten Lindström
Uppsala University
Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation rather than as a function.In our semantic approach, the same relation is used to model belief revision and to give truth-conditions for conditionals. The approach validates a weak version of the Ramsey Test — essentially, a restriction of RT to maximally consistent belief states
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00413567
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,548
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Indicative and subjunctive.V. H. Dudman - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):113.
Basic Conditional Logic.Brian F. Chellas - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
207 ( #41,514 of 2,348,315 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #186,050 of 2,348,315 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes