Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):615-671 (2021)
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Abstract

Kremer presented three approaches of comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth in Kremer, 363–403, 2009). Using these approaches, he established the relationships among ten fixed-point theories suggested by Kripke in, 690–716, 1975) and three revision theories presented by Gupta and Belnap in. This paper continues Kremer’s work. We add five other revision theories to the comparisons, including the theory proposed by Gupta in, 1–60, 1982), the theory proposed by Herzberger in, 61–102, 1982), the theory based on fully-varied revision sequences proposed by Gupta and Belnap in, the theory proposed by Yaqūb in, and the theory based on weakly consistent revision sequences. We show that, the notion of Thomason model defined by Belnap’s limit rule is not equivalent to the one defined by Gupta’s limit rule, and that the theory based on fully-varied revision sequences is ≤2-equivalent to the one based on the greatest intrinsic fixed point of σ.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.

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