Enumeration and explanation in theories of welfare

Analysis 77 (1):65-73 (2017)

Authors
Eden Lin
Ohio State University
Abstract
It has become commonplace to distinguish enumerative theories of welfare, which tell us which things are good for us, from explanatory theories, which tell us why the things that are good for us have that status. It has also been claimed that while hedonism and objective list theories are enumerative but not explanatory, desire satisfactionism is explanatory but not enumerative. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. When properly understood, every major theory of welfare is both enumerative and explanatory.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1093/analys/anx035
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,940
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Preferences and Prudential Reasons.Dale Dorsey - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):157-178.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Classifying Theories of Welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.
The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.
The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being.William A. Lauinger - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968.
Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
The Subjective Intuition.Jennifer S. Hawkins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):61 - 68.
Counterfact Conspiracy Theories.Susan Feldman - 2011 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):15-24.
Health and Well-Being.Jason Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489.
A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare.Ben Bradley - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-04-13

Total views
56 ( #134,805 of 2,235,409 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #145,569 of 2,235,409 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature