Authors
Martin Lin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Material from this paper appears in Chap. 7 of my book Reason and Being, but there is also stuff here that isn't in the book. In particular, it discusses the claims that, for Spinoza, conceiving implies explaining and that existence is identical to or reducible to conceivability. So, if you're interested in those issues, this paper might be worth a read.
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The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Everything is Conceivable: A Note on an Unused Axiom in Spinoza’s Ethics.Justin Vlasits - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy.

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