Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (3):231-237 (2006)
It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas-Penrose arguments and even Penrose's 'new argument' in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose's new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241-250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19-42] and elsewhere of this question
|Keywords||Knowability Logic Mechanism Mind Penrose, Roger Shapiro, Stewart|
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Mechanism, Truth, and Penrose's New Argument.Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):19-42.
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