Remarks on Platonized Naturalism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-15 (2005)
A discussion of views first presented by this author and Edward Zalta in 1995 in the paper “Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism”. That paper presents an application of Zalta’s “object theory” to the ontology of mathematics, and claims that there is a plenitude of abstract objects, all the creatures of distinct mathematical theories. After a summary of the position, two questions concerning the view are singled out for discussion: just how many mathematical objects there are by our account, and the nature of the properties we use to characterize abstract objects. The difference between the authors in more recent developments of the view are also discussed
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DOI croatjphil20055137
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