Substance, attribute, and mode in Spinoza

Philosophy Compass 1 (2):144–153 (2006)
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Abstract

Some of Spinoza's most well‐known doctrines concern what kinds of beings there are and how they are related to each other. For example, he claims that: (1) there is only one substance; (2) this substance has infinitely many attributes; (3) this substance is God or nature; (4) each of these attributes express the divine essence; and (5) all else is a mode of the one substance. These claims have so astonished many of his readers that some of them have surely concluded that they must not know what Spinoza means by “substance,”“attribute,” and “mode.” In this article I shall try to explain how Spinoza understands the basic ontological categories denoted by these expressions.

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Martin Lin
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Hegel’s Idealist Reading of Spinoza.Samuel Newlands - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (2):100-108.
The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza.Colin R. Marshall - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.
Kant e la formazione dei concetti.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - Trento (Italy): Verifiche.
Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes.Karolina Hübner - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):3-34.

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