Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):395-414 (2006)

Authors
Martin Lin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
: Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that the psychological principles that Spinoza appeals to in his account of akrasia are mere ad hoc modifications to his philosophical psychology. I show, on the contrary, that these principles follow from some of the most important and interesting aspects of Spinoza's philosophy of mind
Keywords Spinoza  Akrasia  Mind  Reason  Passions
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2006.0045
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References found in this work BETA

How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Spinoza.Michael Della Rocca - 2008 - New York: Routlege.
Rational Homunculi.Ronald De Sousa - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Two Puzzles Concerning Spinoza's Conception of Belief.Justin Steinberg - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):261-282.
Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia.Eugene Marshall - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):41-59.
Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):144–153.
The Susceptibility of Intuitive Knowledge to Akrasia in Spinoza's Ethical Thought.Sanem Soyarslan - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):725-747.

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