Philosophical Studies 178 (3):867-886 (2021)

Eden Lin
Ohio State University
According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement.
Keywords Well-being  Welfare  Prudential value  Experience requirement  Experientialism  Hedonism  Desire-satisfaction theory  Objective list theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01463-6
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
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The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
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