'The powers that be': Mechanisms that prevent us recognising animal sentience

Essays in Philosophy 5 (2):1-15 (2004)
I propose to identify and illustrate what might be described as ‘the powers that be’ – four mechanisms that prevent us from recognising sentience in animals, and to indicate the challenges that should follow for future work in this field
Keywords Animal  Human  Metaphysics  Sentience
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