The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114 (2016)

Eden Lin
Ohio State University
A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive.
Keywords Welfare  Well-being  Objective list theories  Subjective list theories  Desire satisfactionism  Disjunctive desire satisfactionism
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2015.1014926
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
The Problem of Defective Desires.Chris Heathwood - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize.Eden Lin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):2-23.

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