Synthese:1-30 (forthcoming)

Ying-Tung Lin
National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Vilius Dranseika
Jagiellonian University
Imagination and other forms of mental simulation allow us to live beyond the current immediate environment. Imagination that involves an experience of self further enables one to incorporate or utilize the contents of episodic simulation in a way that is of importance to oneself. However, the simulated self can be found in a variety of forms. The present study provides some empirical data to explore the various ways in which the self could be represented in observer-perspective imagination as well as the potential limits on such representations. In observer-perspective imagination, the point of view or perspective is dissociated from the location of one’s simulated body. We have found that while there are different ways to identify with oneself in an observer-perspective imagination, the identification is rarely dissociated from first-person perspective in imagination. Such variety and limits pave the way for understanding how we identify with ourselves in imagination. Our results suggest that the first-person perspective is a strong attractor for identification. The empirical studies and analysis in this paper demonstrate how observer-perspective episodic simulation serves as a special case for research on identification in mental simulation, and similar methods can be applied in the studies of memory and future thinking.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03230-4
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,481
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Self-Projection and the Brain.Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.
Memory: A Self-Referential Account.Jordi Fernández - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Meeting with the Depicted Other.Marge Paas - 2015 - Philosophy Study 5 (10).
The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):968-978.
Imagination, Inference, and Apriority.Antonella Mallozzi - 2021 - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), The Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge.
On Kant's Persistent Stance on Imagination.Jian-jun Wang - 2008 - Modern Philosophy 2:109-113.
Affective Memory: A Little Help From Our Imagination.Margherita Arcangeli & Jérôme Dokic - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. pp. 139-156.


Added to PP index

Total views
12 ( #781,517 of 2,446,285 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #55,904 of 2,446,285 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes