Abstract
ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation also helps us to see that Wittgenstein’s other remark, that to follow a rule is a custom, is also a grammatical one.
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2019.1604314
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References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
The Individual Strikes Back.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.
Philosophical Grammar.Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees & Anthony Kenny - 1975 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 8 (4):260-262.

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