Demotivating Intentional Mentalism

Theoria 83 (4):298-318 (2017)
Authors
Joachim Lipski
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)
Abstract
Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
Keywords content  conventionalism  intentionality  language of thought  mentalism  pragmatism
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12126
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