Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence

Acta Analytica 37 (3):341-352 (2022)
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Abstract

In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers :6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is not constructed in a satisfactory way and calls the flaw in establishing it the pre-illusion problem. The third part demonstrates that the existing defense of strong illusionism does not save it from the pre-illusion problem, while the fourth part of the paper outlines two strategies to fight the pre-illusion problem, concluding, however, that they fail to do so, and indicates one possible way in which illusionism might be, nevertheless, coherently established.

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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