Disputatio 7:28-39 (1999)
This paper reassesses the question of whether Craig’s theorem poses a challenge to Quine's empirical underdetermination thesis. It will be demonstrated that Quine’s account of this issue in his paper “Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (1975) is flawed and that Quine makes too strong a concession to the Craigian challenge. It will further be pointed out that Craig’s theorem would threaten the empirical underdetermination thesis only if the set of all relevant observation conditionals could be shown to be recursively enumerable — a condition which Quine seems to overlook — and it will be argued that, at least within the framework of Quine’s philosophy, it is doubtful whether this condition is satisfiable.
|Keywords||Empirical underdetermination thesis Craig's theorem Quine-Duhem thesis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?Ian McDiarmid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):279-293.
Similar books and articles
Incompatible Empirically Equivalent Theories: A Structural Explication.Thomas Mormann - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):203 - 249.
Are Quine’s Two Indeterminacy Theses Compatible?Gábor Forrai - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99..
Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination, and Systems of the World.Carl Hoefer & Alexander Rosenberg - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):592-607.
Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2012 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 303--313.
Added to index2010-07-25
Total downloads73 ( #71,886 of 2,169,401 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,461 of 2,169,401 )
How can I increase my downloads?