Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem

Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306 (2001)
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Abstract

This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in Condorcet's paradox) are in large electorates.

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Author Profiles

Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Robert Goodin
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Is Peer Review a Good Idea?Remco Heesen & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.
The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation.John Danaher - 2016 - Philosophy and Technology 29 (3):245-268.
The epistemology of democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):8-22.
Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The social contract.Jean-Jacques Rousseau - 1947 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Charles Frankel.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.

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