From McGee's puzzle to the Lottery Paradox


Vann McGee has presented a putative counterexample to modus ponens. I show that (a slightly modified version of) McGee’s election scenario has the same structure as a famous lottery scenario by Kyburg. More specifically, McGee’s election story can be taken to show that, if the Lockean Thesis holds, rational belief is not closed under classical logic, including classical-logic modus ponens. This conclusion defies the existing accounts of McGee’s puzzle.



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Lina Maria Lissia
University of Turin

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References found in this work

Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.
A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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