Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem

Theory and Decision 52 (3):287-301 (2002)
Abstract
Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In particular, even if preferences are single-peaked across individuals within each dimension – a situation called intradimensional single-peakedness – any aggregation procedure satisfying Arrow-type conditions will make one dimension dominant. I introduce lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions as a class of possible aggregation procedures under intradimensional single-peakedness. The interpretation of the results is discussed
Keywords Arrow's theorem  single-peakedness  multidimensional preference orderings
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DOI 10.1023/A:1019620322895
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