Judgment aggregation: A short introduction

In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier (2012)

Authors
Christian List
London School of Economics
Abstract
The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, which allows me to present some illustrative variants of a generic impossibility result. I subsequently turn to the question of how this impossibility result can be avoided, going through several possible escape routes. Finally, I relate the theory of judgment aggregation to other branches of aggregation theory. Rather than offering a comprehensive survey of the theory of judgment aggregation, I hope to introduce the theory in a succinct and pedagogical way, providing an illustrative rather than exhaustive coverage of some of its key ideas and results.
Keywords Discursive dilemma  Doctrinal paradox  Judgment aggregation  Social choice theory  Logic  Arrow's theorem
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References found in this work BETA

Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin van Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.

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