Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):201-220 (2006)

Authors
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
At the core of republican thought, on Philip Pettit’s account, lies the conception of freedom as non-domination, as opposed to freedom as noninterference in the liberal sense. I revisit the distinction between liberal and republican freedom and argue that republican freedom incorporates a particular rule-of-law requirement, whereas liberal freedom does not. Liberals may also endorse such a requirement, but not as part of their conception of freedom itself. I offer a formal analysis of this rule-of-law requirement and compare liberal and republican freedom on its basis. While I agree with Pettit that republican freedom has broader implications than liberal freedom, I conclude that we face a trade-off between two dimensions of freedom (scope and robustness) and that it is harder for republicans to solve that trade-off than it is for liberals. Key Words: freedom • republicanism • liberalism • noninterference • non-domination • rule of law • robustness • liberal paradox.
Keywords Republicanism  Freedom  Non-domination  Non-interference  Robustness  Rule of law
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DOI 10.1177/1470594X06064222
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References found in this work BETA

Defending Laws in the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):56?83.
Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma and Republican Theory.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In James Fishkin & Peter Laslett (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford, UK: Blackwel. pp. 138-162.
Liberalism and Individual Preferences.John Craven - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (4):351-360.
Comment on Craven.Gary Anthony Gigliotti - 1986 - Theory and Decision 21 (1):89-95.

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Citations of this work BETA

Freedom as Independence.Christian List & Laura Valentini - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1043–1074.
When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
Slaves, Prisoners, and Republican Freedom.Fabian Wendt - 2011 - Res Publica 17 (2):175-192.
The Rule of Law and Equality.Paul Gowder - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (5):565-618.
A Fault Line in Ethical Theory.Shyam Nair - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):173-200.

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