Reliability in mathematical physics

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-21 (1993)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue three things: (1) that the interactionist view underlying Benacerraf's (1973) challenge to mathematical beliefs renders inexplicable the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics; (2) that examples from mathematical physics suggest that we should view reliability differently; and (3) that abstract mathematical considerations are indispensable to explanations of the reliability of our beliefs.

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Michael Liston
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Citations of this work

Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
On Tins and Tin-Openers.Michael Liston - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 151--160.

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References found in this work

Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times.M. Kline - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):68-87.
Fact and Method.Richard W. Miller - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):159-162.

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