Strategy-proof judgment aggregation

Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300 (2007)

Christian List
London School of Economics
Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Strategy-proofness  Strategic voting  Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem  Premise-based procedure  Conclusion-based procedure  Social choice  Discursive dilemma  Doctrinal paradox
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267107001496
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Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.

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Judgment Aggregation: A Survey.Christian List & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Christian List & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.

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