The naturalistic case for free will

In Stavros Ioannidis, Gal Vishne, Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Cham: Springer (forthcoming)

Abstract

The aim of this expository paper is to give an informal overview of a plausible naturalistic case for free will. I will describe what I take to be the main naturalistically motivated challenges for free will and respond to them by presenting an indispensability argument for free will. The argument supports the reality of free will as an emergent higher-level phenomenon. I will also explain why the resulting picture of free will does not conflict with the possibility that the fundamental laws of nature are deterministic, and I will address some common objections.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-19

Downloads
169 (#71,594)

6 months
169 (#3,019)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
The Supervenience Argument.Jason Turner - 2004 - Florida Philosophical Review 4 (1):12-24.
What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.
Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance.Penelope Mackie - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:265-287.
Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Free Will in Process Perspective.Donald W. Viney & Donald A. Crosby - 1994 - New Ideas in Psychology 12:129-41.
O’Connor’s Argument for Indeterminism.Samuel Murray - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):268-275.