Synthese 187 (1):179-207 (2012)

Authors
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers new to the field of judgment aggregation a sense of this rapidly growing research area.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Discursive dilemma  Condorcet’s paradox  Arrow’s impossibility theorem  Social choice theory  Democracy  Doctrinal paradox
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Reprint years 2012
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3
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References found in this work BETA

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.

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Citations of this work BETA

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.

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