When to defer to supermajority testimony — and when not
In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249 (2014)
Abstract
Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” inconsistencies in an agent’s beliefs while permitting less blatant ones, and show that, while super-majoritarian deference often fails to ensure full consistency, it is a route to consistency in this weaker sense.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Aesthetic testimony: What can we learn from others about beauty and art?Aaron Meskin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony.Joel Buenting - 2005 - Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48.
Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
Problems of sincerity.Richard Moran - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):341–361.
Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.Matthew Carl Weiner - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
465 (#23,017)
6 months
12 (#77,275)
2009-01-28
Downloads
465 (#23,017)
6 months
12 (#77,275)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Aggregation Theory and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others.Franz Dietrich - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 160:463-493.
Deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls.Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin & Iain McLean - 2013 - Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95.
Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.
References found in this work
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.