Computation, connectionism and modelling the mind

Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):357-364 (1997)
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Any analysis of the concept of computation as it occurs in the context of a discussion of the computational model of the mind must be consonant with the philosophic burden traditionally carried by that concept as providing a bridge between a physical and a psychological description of an agent. With this analysis in hand, one may ask the question: are connectionist-based systems consistent with the computational model of the mind? The answer depends upon which of several versions of connectionism one presupposes: non-learning connectionist-based systems as simulated on digital computers are consistent with the computational model of the mind, whereas connectionist-based systems (/dynamical systems) qua analog systems are not



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