Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel

Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38 (2013)
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Abstract

In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of reason problem. Reflection on the preface paradox suggests as much. Second, while I agree with Kroedel that permissions do not agglomerate, I do not think that this fact can help us solve the lottery paradox. First, I do not think we have any good reason to think that we’re permitted to believe any lottery propositions. Second, I do not see any good reason to think that epistemic permissions do not agglomerate.

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.

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