Evidence and Knowledge

Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more radically from E = K

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,038

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
Knowledge as evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.
Evidence does not equal knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.
Probability and scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.
Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
E Does Not Equal K.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - The Reasoner 7:30-31.
Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis.Phyllis McKay Illari - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139-157.
Why Williamson should be a sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-10-17

Downloads
386 (#52,106)

6 months
24 (#116,897)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.
Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.
Deliberation, judgement and the nature of evidence.Jon Williamson - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):27-65.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.

View all 42 references / Add more references