Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in current debates in epistemology and beyond. In this volume a team of established and emerging scholars presents new work on the key debates. They consider what epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion, and action, and explore the interconnections between these standards.
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ISBN(s) 9780199660025   0199660026
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.

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