Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion
Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.)
Oxford University Press (2013)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in current debates in epistemology and beyond. In this volume a team of established and emerging scholars presents new work on the key debates. They consider what epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion, and action, and explore the interconnections between these standards.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2014 |
| Buy this book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
| ISBN(s) | 9780199660025 0199660026 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
Chapters BETA
``Epistemic Encroachment and Responsibility: Two Approaches to Norms of Assertion&Quot.Jonathan L. Kvanvig
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, Eds., Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Benjamin W. McCraw - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (4):204-207.
Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
A Refined Account of the "Epistemic Game": Epistemic Norms, Temptations, and Epistemic Coorperation.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):383-396.
Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
Why Pragmatic Justifications of Epistemic Norms Don't Work.V. Mitova - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):139-150.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Re-Reconciling the Epistemic and Ontic Views of Explanation.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):919-949.
Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2010-11-29
Total views
18 ( #562,544 of 2,411,342 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #346,261 of 2,411,342 )
2010-11-29
Total views
18 ( #562,544 of 2,411,342 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #346,261 of 2,411,342 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
