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Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion
Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.)
New York: Oxford University Press (2013)
Abstract
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in current debates in epistemology and beyond. In this volume a team of established and emerging scholars presents new work on the key debates. They consider what epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion, and action, and explore the interconnections between these standards.Author Profiles
Reprint years
2014
Call number
BD161.E588 2014
ISBN(s)
9780199660025 0199660026
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Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, eds., Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Benjamin W. McCraw - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (4):204-207.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
A Refined Account of the "Epistemic Game": Epistemic Norms, Temptations, and Epistemic Coorperation.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):383-396.
Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don't work.V. Mitova - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):139-150.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Re-reconciling the Epistemic and Ontic Views of Explanation.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):919-949.
Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
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Citations of this work
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
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