Fake Barns and false dilemmas

Episteme 11 (4):369-389 (2014)
Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try to rectify here.
Keywords Virtue Epistemology  Anti-Luck Epistemology  Knowledge  Gettier Cases
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2014.24
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References found in this work BETA

Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.

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