From E = K to scepticism?

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684 (2008)
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Abstract

In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about die external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.
Evidence and Knowledge.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262.
Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.
Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):243-272.

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References found in this work

How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Why Williamson should be a sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.

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