In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.
Keywords Knowledge-First
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.
Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
La Verdad en el Gnosticismo.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 3:217-241.

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