Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609 (2020)

Authors
Julien Dutant
King's College London
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith 2016, Goodman and Salow 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. These cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or too externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on *knowledge*, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification, that depends directly upon normality.
Keywords Normality  Normic Support  Proof Paradoxes  Knowledge-First  Justification  Preface Paradox
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Reprint years 2020
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01276-2
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.
A Case for Weak Safety.Niklaas Tepelmann - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):545-569.
The Normality of Error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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