Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609 (2020)
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Abstract |
There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith 2016, Goodman and Salow 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. These cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or too externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on *knowledge*, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification, that depends directly upon normality.
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Keywords | Normality Normic Support Proof Paradoxes Knowledge-First Justification Preface Paradox |
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Reprint years | 2020 |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-019-01276-2 |
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Knowledge, Safety, and Gettierized Lottery Cases: Why Mere Statistical Evidence is Not a (Safe) Source of Knowledge.Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.
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