Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth

Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365 (2014)

Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
A standard objection to the suggestion that the fundamental norm of assertion is the truth norm (i.e., one must not assert p unless p) is that this norm cannot explain why warrant requires knowledge-level evidence. In a recent paper, Whiting has defended the truth-first approach to the norms of assertion by appeal to a distinction between the warrant there is to assert and the warrant one has to assert. I shall argue that this latest defensive strategy is unsuccessful
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9603-3
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.

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