Moore's paradox and epistemic norms

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100 (2010)
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Abstract

We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.
Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.

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